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Abstract 
 
The migration of labor from rural to urban areas is an important part of the urbanization 
process in developing countries. Even though it has been the focus of abundant research 
over the past five decades, some key policy questions have not found clear answers yet. 
To what extent is internal migration a desirable phenomenon and under what 
circumstances? Should governments intervene and if so with what types of interventions? 
What should be their policy objectives? To shed light on these important issues, we 
survey the existing theoretical models and their conflicting policy implications, and 
discuss the policies that may be justified based on recent relevant empirical studies. A 
key limitation is that much of the empirical literature does not provide structural tests of 
the theoretical models, but only provides partial findings that can support or invalidate 
intuitions and in that sense support or invalidate the policy implications of the models. 
Our broad assessment of the literature is that migration can be beneficial or at least be 
turned into a beneficial phenomenon, so that in general migration restrictions are not 






In developing economies, structural changes often have profound spatial implications. 
The present survey focuses on labor-related migration from rural to urban areas, a general 
pattern which plays a central role in the urbanization process and is often viewed as the 
labor market adjustment to the inter sectoral shift in importance from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services.
1 Rural to urban migration has historically been an important 
part of the urbanization process and continues to be significant in scale, even though 
migration rates appear to have slowed down in some countries. Migration from rural 
areas accounted for at least half of all urban growth in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s 
and about 25% of urban growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Brockerhoff, 1995). In Brazil, at 
the peak of its urbanization process, it is estimated that over 20 million people moved 
from rural to urban areas between the 1950s and the 1970s. In comparison, 20.5 million 
people in India (30% of national urban growth) moved from rural to urban areas in the 
1990s (Census of India, 2005).  
 
                                                 
1 In this survey, we do not focus on amenity-based migration which explains the migration of students or of 
retired people. Nor do we focus on forced migration (due to war or civil unrest).   4
In this paper, we provide a policy-oriented survey of the research carried out on internal 
migration in developing countries over the past five decades. Many studies have focused 
on how internal migrants behave at different stages of the migration process. How do 
migrants prepare for migration? How do they migrate? What are the difficulties they face 
on arriving in urban areas? What links do they maintain with rural areas?  
 
This review synthesizes the current state of knowledge concerning internal migration in 
developing countries. As far as the preparation phase is concerned, studies show that 
potential migrants invest in education before migrating, anticipating that human capital 
will be needed or better rewarded in the city (Kochar, 2004). They may also gather 
information about jobs from migrant networks (Roberts, 2001) or search for a job from 
their rural base (Banerjee, 1991), which reduces both the risk of temporary 
unemployment and the uncertainty on the returns to migration.  
 
The migration decision has been shown to be selective. Migration mainly concerns young 
adults who are more likely to have a positive net expected return on migration due to 
their longer remaining life expectancy, or because social norms require that young adults 
migrate in search of a better life (De Haan and Rogally, 2002). Family strategies can 
involve sending young adults to the city, and investing in a potentially remitting child 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985). Both low and high skilled individuals are more likely to migrate 
but usually for different reasons: “surplus” low-skilled individuals have strong incentives 
to move to the city in search of a manual job they may not find in the rural area, while 
“scarce” educated workers may find that their human capital is better rewarded in cities 
than in rural areas (Lanzona, 1998, Agesa, 2001). In most countries, internal migration 
concerns young men because urban job markets usually offer a large share of occupations 
available to rural male migrants, or because men bear lower risks of vulnerability than 
women when migrating. Latin America, in which the migration of female domestic 
workers has become predominant, stands out as an exception.  
 
The decision to migrate also involves contextual factors, such as ‘push factors’ which 
force migrants out of rural areas and ‘pull factors’ which attract migrants to urban areas.   5
These factors typically reflect the relative strength of the local economies (such as the 
availability and remuneration of jobs), the existence of local amenities, the cost and 
availability of public goods, or even institutional factors. For instance, the introduction or 
enforcement of a system of land property rights might act as a push factor and encourage 
migration from rural areas for workers that are displaced, as well as for the new land 
owners, since owners can leave their properties without the fear of losing their assets and 
can even sell them or use them as collaterals to finance migration. The absence of a rural 
credit market may also act as a push factor when migration of a family member is used to 
generate remittances in order to overcome credit constraints and finance rural productive 
investments (see Katz and Stark, 1986a). Of course, the migration decision also depends 
on its monetary and non-monetary costs. Distance to potential destinations has been 
shown to deter migration (Schwartz, 1973, Greenwood, Ladman and Siegel, 1981). A 
few studies suggest that migration is facilitated by the concentration of the migrant pool 
(of same origin) in the area of destination (Mora and Taylor, 2005). 
 
Other recent studies shed light on the assimilation of migrants to the urban labor-market. 
Indeed, the first concern of migrants when arriving in a city is often to secure a job, 
which can prove difficult as migrants are likely to have only imperfect information about 
the type or quality of job opportunities they face (Banerjee, 1984a). In order to find a job, 
they often resort to informal channels such as friends and networks (Banerjee and Bucci, 
1995). Finding a job is facilitated when the same-origin network at destination is larger 
but this does not preclude the existence of a congestion effect if migrants compete with 
one another for jobs (Yamauchi and Tanabe, 2003). In a dynamic perspective, it has also 
been found that education enhances migrants’ learning from their experience in the labor 
market of destination and thus accelerates the convergence of migrants’ earnings towards 
natives’ earnings (Yamauchi, 2004). Of course, the difficulties faced by migrants of rural 
origin are numerous. In particular, they might be discriminated against (Assaad, 1997, 
Meng and Zhang, 2001) and can have difficulties gaining access to credit and local public 
goods.  
   6
Once settled in a city, migrants often remit to their families in the rural area of origin. An 
abundant literature on this issue shows that the motives can be diverse (see Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2005). Remitting might serve to take care of the migrants assets and relatives 
back home (Cox, Eser and Jimenez, 1998), to invest in one’s parents to secure potential 
bequests (De la Brière, Sadoulet, Janvry and Lambert, 2002), to insure one’s family 
against volatile incomes (Gubert, 2002), or to repay a loan (Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999). 
Remitting can also be justified by sheer altruism or social norms (Azam and Gubert, 
2002). Interestingly, remittances sent to rural areas might benefit different populations 
depending on the context, which implies that remittances do not systematically benefit 
the poor or the rich.
2 The diversity of contexts also explains that remittances serve a 
variety of uses. They can be used for consumption (Banerjee, 1984b), for housing 
investments when anticipating the event of return migration (Osili, 2004), as well as 
capital expenditure (Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
 
It should be clear from the summary above that the literature has provided many 
descriptive insights into the phenomenon of urban migration. However, in spite of five 
decades of abundant research, some key policy questions have not found clear answers 
yet:  
(i) To what extent is internal migration a desirable phenomenon and under what 
circumstances?  
(ii) Should governments intervene and if so with what types of  interventions?  
(iii)  For the latter, what should be the policy objectives? 
Answering these questions is not easy given that internal migration may have both 
positive and negative implications. On the one hand, internal migration is a prerequisite 
for urbanization, a phenomenon whose role has long been recognized as the key correlate 
accompanying economic growth, at least in the case of European cities in the 19
th and 
early 20
th centuries. In developing countries, internal migration can also be a source of 
                                                 
2 One reason for this could be that different countries stand at different phases of their urban transition, a 
phenomenon during which landlord families migrate before peasant families. Knowles and Anker (1981) 
suggest that remittances benefit more the rich than the poor in Kenya, a country which was then at the 
beginning of the urbanization process, while De Haan (2002) argues that in India, a country well into the 
urbanization process, remittances may form a more important part of poor households’ income than that of 
the better-off.   7
remittances to rural areas, contributing to rural development -- both directly if used in 
education and productive investments, and indirectly via higher consumption levels. But, 
on the other hand, internal migration from rural to urban areas can exert a lot of pressure 
on cities who may not have the capacity to absorb large population flows and to provide 
migrants with an adequate level of public goods. This can lead to slum formation and in 
extreme cases to internal crime and unrest.  Urbanization may also lead to an unbalanced 
distribution of the population and contribute to increasing disparities between rural and 
urban areas. In view of these potentially opposite effects, it is not surprising that 
governments have implemented conflicting policies ranging from policies to restrict rural 
to urban migration to policies to accommodate, or even stimulate migration flows. The 
current view among experts increasingly tends to support the last two types of policies 
(see Skeldon, 2003a and 2003b, or Waddington, 2003). But how many of these 
recommendations are based on economic analysis and justification? 
 
The objective of the present work is to shed some light on internal migration policies in 
developing countries in the light of economic theory. To do this, not only is it important 
to understand migration patterns but the related welfare issues also need to be analyzed 
and the consequences of internal migration to be properly assessed. Are the existing 
models relevant and have they been properly evaluated by empirical tests? What are the 
policy implications of these models? To what extent do empirical findings shed light on 
policy issues? We try to answer these questions in two steps. The next section reviews the 
existing theoretical models and their policy implications. Section 3 presents relevant 
empirical studies and discusses the extent to which policies could find justifications in 
their results. We also discuss the methodology of these models and empirical studies and 
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2 THEORETICAL MODELS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
For the purpose of our discussion, we classify the different theoretical frameworks in 
which internal migration has been modeled into three types: the first type covers the dual 
economy models which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, the second type covers the 
Harris-Todaro models developed in the 1970s and 1980s, and the third type covers the 
more elaborate microeconomic models on which much of the research has focused over 
the past 15 years (including some important contributions to the so-called New 
Economics of Labor Migration).
3 We will survey these families of models and their 
policy implications sequentially. 
 
2.1 The beneficial role of migration in early dual economy models 
 
The first theoretical work involving rural to urban migration is the Lewis (1954) model of 
development which tries to explain the transition from a stagnating economy based on a 
traditional rural sector to a growing economy driven by the development of a modern 
urban sector. In this model, economic growth does not only stem from the accumulation 
of capital in modern industry but also from the interaction between the rural and the 
urban sectors. Lewis assumes that rural economies initially present a specific context in 
which there is ‘surplus labor’ in the agricultural sector, so that marginal productivity in 
that sector is close to zero. Workers in the rural sector are assumed to share the output 
among themselves so that they are remunerated at their mean product.
4 Given these 
assumptions, the agricultural sector is able to supply a perfectly elastic labor force to the 
modern  industrial sector which can grow by accumulating capital and poaching labor 
from the traditional agricultural sector, paying wages just equal to the mean product in 
the agricultural sector. The transfer of the labor force between the two economic sectors 
involves the reallocation of the labor force across space through migration from low 
population density rural to high population density urban areas. Migration occurs until 
surplus labor or ‘disguised unemployment’ is absorbed by the modern sector. Ranis and 
                                                 
3 For a presentation of the New Economics of Migration and its research program, see Stark (1991). For a 
mostly empirical survey on internal migration in developing countries, see Lucas (1997). 
4 The reason for this payment arrangement is to avoid having workers paid a wage equal to zero as would 
imply marginal productivity remuneration under surplus labor.   9
Fei (1961) introduce the possibility of technical progress in the agricultural sector and 
assume that the agricultural sector can also absorb capital investments. In that extension, 
the duration of the take-off process increases with the rate of demographic growth and 
decreases with the intensity of the investment effort in both economic sectors.  
 
Both the Lewis and Ranis and Fei formalizations describe in a very stylized manner a 
general mechanism occurring at an initial stage of economic development, which justifies 
the assumed scarcity of capital and the abundance of labor in these models. The 
assumption of zero marginal productivity and remuneration at the average product in the 
agricultural sector is more debatable and has been criticized even though it probably 
should not be taken at face value: what really matters in the model is that the rural sector 
can massively provide migrants to the urban sector. In this simple framework, internal 
migration is desirable to the extent that it accompanies growth.  
 
The policy implication of this model is that governments in countries experiencing a 
transition from a labor-intensive agricultural economy to an economy with significant 
industrial and services sectors should see to it that migration from rural to urban areas is 
at least not impeded, and ideally is even facilitated.  
 
This type of model also suggests that government should ensure that investments are 
intense enough for the take-off to ever occur. This would tend to argue in favor of 
policies favoring investments in modern labor-intensive industries in order to exhaust 
rural disguised unemployment. It is important, nevertheless, to keep in mind that the 
Lewis framework applies only to a particular phase of the development process and sheds 
little light on other contexts. It appears to inadequately describe the urbanization process 
of many Sub-Saharan African countries, even at the beginning of their urban transition.
5 
In particular, the observation in the late 1960s that urban areas experienced high levels of 
unemployment suggested that these models might not tell the right story about rural urban 
interactions.  
 
                                                 
5 For evidence of urbanization without growth in Africa, see Fay and Opal, 2000.   10
2.2 The harmful role of migration in Todarian models 
 
The Todaro (1969) and Harris-Todaro (1970) models also consider the role of internal 
migration in a dual economy in which the urban sector draws labor force from the rural 
sector. But the change of focus is radical. In the Lewis model, internal migration removed 
‘disguised unemployment’ from rural areas and enabled the transition to a modern 
economy. In Todarian models, the focus is on explaining the existence of unemployment 
in urban areas and its link with internal migration. 
 
2.2.1) The basic setting 
 
Todaro’s intuition and the Todaro paradox 
 
Todaro (1969) proposes a simple dynamic formalization in which individual migration 
decisions are based on the difference between the discounted expected income streams in 
urban and rural areas net of migration costs. In this model, an urban job-seeker evaluates 
his discounted expected income stream in the city taking into account the endogenous 
probability of being employed. While labor demand in the city exogenously increases at a 
constant rate over time, labor supply increases with migration at an endogenous rate 
which is assumed to be a function of the difference in discounted expected income 
streams between the urban and the rural area. In steady state, migration flows ensure that 
the urban labor force grows at exactly the same rate as labor demand, determining a 
constant equilibrium unemployment rate in the city. The main contribution of Todaro’s 
framework is thus to link urban unemployment and migration flows. Under certain 
parameter values, the intensity of the link can lead to a paradox (known as the Todaro 
paradox): a policy aiming at increasing the number of available jobs in a city may very 
well increase the level of unemployment because of induced migration. This can easily be 
seen by writing a simplified version of the model.
6 If we denote by λ the exogenous rate 
of urban job creation, LM the level of urban employment, and L-LR the total labor force 
supplied to the city, the number of job creation is λLM , and the number of unemployed 
                                                 
6 This is partly borrowed from Todaro 2000, Appendix 8.1. Our notations follow those of Basu (1997).   11
workers is L-LR-LM. Considering that the probability of obtaining a job in the urban sector 
over a given period is given by the ratio of jobs created to the number of job seekers (i.e. 
assuming that all jobs turn over in each period and random job selection), the probability 
of finding a job for an unemployed worker is thus λLM / (L-LR-LM). Denoting w and r the 
urban wage and the rural income respectively, the expected urban-rural income 
differential δ is then: 
 
  δ = wλLM / (L-LR-LM) - r  (2.1) 
 
Assuming that migration responds to the income differential δ implies that L-LR should 
be considered a function of δ. From (2.1), any policy affecting the rate of job creation λ 
will thus have an impact on the expected income differential δ and, in turn, on the urban 
labor supply L-LR. The Todaro paradox will occur if the increase in labor supply d(L-
LR)/dλ=(d(L-LR)/dδ).(dδ/dλ) is greater than the increase in labor demand d(λLM)/dλ=LM. 
Using (2.1), the condition for an increase in the unemployment level is as follows: 
 
 (d(L-LR)/(L-LR)) / (dδ/δ)  >  (δ/w) ((L-LR-LM)/(L-LR)) (2.2) 
 
The interpretation is as follows: if the elasticity of urban labor supply with respect to the 
income differential between urban and rural areas (the LHS in 2.2) is greater than the 
income differential –written as a percentage of the urban wage– multiplied by the 
unemployment rate in the urban area (the RHS in 2.2), an increase in job creation will 
trigger an increase in the number of unemployed workers. Todaro argues that this 
formalizes what happened in Kenya in 1964 when the Kenyan government and private 
employers agreed to immediately increase employment levels by 15 percent but only 
managed to increase overall unemployment by attracting new workers to cities. However, 
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The standard Harris-Todaro model 
 
Harris and Todaro (1970) presented a static framework version of the Todaro model in 
which the interaction between the rural and urban sectors is more detailed. Using the 
same notations as before, let us consider an economy with L workers among which, in 
equilibrium, LR will remain in the rural area and will be employed in the rural agricultural 
or traditional sector, and L-LR will reside in the urban area. There is no unemployment in 
the rural sector and perfect competition in that sector ensures that the rural labor is 
remunerated according to its endogenous marginal productivity f’R(LR).
7 In the urban 
manufacturing or modern sector, labor is remunerated at a fixed and exogenous minimum 
wage w, which means that the stock of urban jobs LM is fixed and satisfies f’M(LM)=w. 
The supply of labor in the urban sector L-LR incorporates migrants to the city, but only LM 
workers will be employed in the urban sector. This implies that the employment rate is 
equal to LM/( L-LR). As in the Todaro model, the excess of job seekers over available 
urban jobs imposes the existence of a rationing mechanism: assuming random job 
selection, the probability that an urban resident is employed is given by the proportion of 
the urban labor force which is actually employed LM/(L-LR). The expected income in the 
urban sector is given by the minimum wage multiplied by this proportion. Contrary to 
what happens in the dynamic Todaro model, migration is now only a disequilibrium 
phenomenon. It occurs in the transition to the equilibrium to ensure that the urban 
unemployment rate equates expected incomes in the urban and the rural sectors. This 
corresponds to the following equilibrium condition:  
 
 f’R(LR) = wLM / (L-LR) (2.3) 
 
Interestingly, the Harris-Todaro formalization implies that the Todaro paradox is more 
likely to occur when the labor-demand elasticity in the urban sector is large. To see this, 
assume for simplification that flows out of the rural sector do not change much the rural 
                                                 
7 Contrary to Lewis’ assumption of zero marginal productivity, this implies that outmigration from the rural 
area now decreases the production in the traditional sector.   13
wage so that f’R(LR) can be treated as constant in our calculations.
8 Let us consider a 
policy of job creation in the urban sector (implying a reduction in the fixed wage w since 
f’M(LM)=w must continue to hold). Let us denote by ε < 0 the labor-demand elasticity in 
the urban sector (dLM/LM) / (dw/w). Using (2.3), calculations yield:  
 
 d(L-LR) / dLM = (1+1/ε) (w/f’R(LR)) (2.4) 
 
It is easy to see from the above equation that job creation (an increase in LM and the 
associated decrease in w) will induce rural-urban migration (an increase in L-LR) 
whenever the RHS of (2.4) is positive, which occurs if ε < -1. Furthermore, migration to 
the city will exceed the number of jobs created if the urban labor-demand elasticity is 
sufficiently large in absolute terms, i.e. if ε < -w/(w-f’R(LR)). The result is intuitive by 
looking at (2.3): the increased labor demand initially reduces the size of the urban 
unemployment pool and increases the probability of formal sector employment in the city 
LM/(L-LR). This in turn attracts migrants and decreases the labor supply LR in the rural 
sector until expected wages are equalized across regions and (2.3) is satisfied again. In 
other words, with a large elasticity of labor demand in the urban sector (in absolute 
terms), a fixed objective of job creation will only require a small decrease in the fixed 
wage but a significant amount of migration to the city in order to equalize expected 
wages across regions again. When the elasticity is sufficiently large, the large inflow 
exceeds the number of jobs created and the level of unemployment increases.
9 
 
2.2.2) Policy recommendations arising from the Harris-Todaro models 
 
Apart from its apparent consistency with stylized facts (reconciling internal migration 
and urban unemployment), another important feature of the Harris-Todaro model is to 
lend itself to a simple welfare analysis showing that the market equilibrium is suboptimal, 
                                                 
8 This assumption is also adopted by Stark, Gupta and Levhari (1991) to study the model’s comparative 
statics in a similar fashion. 
9 Observe that in the Harris-Todaro framework, the urban unemployment rate must always decline 
following a policy of job expansion, even if the number of unemployed workers increases. This can be seen 
by writing the derivative of the employment rate with respect to the number of available urban jobs. This 
yields d(LM/(L-LR)) / dLM = -(f’R(LR)/w
2) (dw/dLM), which is always positive.   14
thereby providing directions for government interventions. The suboptimality stems from 
the institutionally determined urban minimum wage. With this market imperfection, the 
allocation of labor is not efficient from a productive point of view because marginal 
products are not equalized across sectors (see Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1974, Basu, 
1980). It is instead expected incomes that are equalized in the equilibrium migration 
condition (2.3). The optimal allocation would naturally be attained in the laissez-faire 
competitive equilibrium in the absence of the urban wage rigidity and no unemployment. 
 
This suboptimality justifies policy recommendations of two kinds in order to improve 
welfare: acting on migration and/or wages. Understanding that there is ‘excess 
migration’, the question is how to best attenuate the urban unemployment problem 
without encouraging migration from rural to urban areas.  
 
Disincentives to and restrictions on migration  
 
Given the model’s predictions, one policy is to restrict migration flows. If migration in 
excess of the labor required to produce the urban output is prohibited, then aggregate 
welfare is always increased because this policy increases rural output without 
diminishing the production of the urban good.
10 Many countries have followed this path 




Since the inefficiency in the Harris-Todaro model comes from a wage rigidity, another 
policy emerging from the analysis is to reform wages. In the Harris-Todaro perspective, 
reforms that make urban wages less rigid should bring the allocation of labor in the 
economy closer to the optimum. Alternately, taking the wage rigidity as given, policy 
reforms arising from welfare analysis focus on wage subsidies. Harris and Todaro (1970) 
                                                 
10 However, this policy may be detrimental to rural dwellers: the permanent urban labor force always gains 
from migration restrictions (due to full employment at the fixed minimum wage and the availability of the 
agricultural good at a low price) but when the demand for the agricultural good is not sufficiently elastic, 
the terms of trade according to which rural dwellers can exchange the rural good for the urban good 
deteriorates.   15
considered the case of a wage subsidy to the urban sector alone, showing that it cannot 
restore the social optimum and causes suboptimal employment in the rural sector because 
of induced migration. With this instrument, the best that can be done is to ensure that 
urban jobs are created until the marginal productivity in the urban sector equates the 
marginal amount of rural output sacrificed because of migration (i.e. the marginal 
productivity in the rural sector multiplied by the number of migrants induced by the 
creation of a single additional urban job). Combining an urban wage subsidy and 
migration restrictions can move the economy to a greater aggregate welfare by 
simultaneously increasing the urban output through wage subsidies and preventing the 
exacerbation of unemployment through migration restrictions. However, as Harris and 
Todaro (1970) pointed out, this policy will  require a substantial compensation to the 
rural sector to ensure a Pareto-improvement in utilities. 
 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) argued that policies should not be restricted to urban-
wage subsidies and migration restrictions as proposed by Harris and Todaro. In fact, 
policies need not necessarily restrict migration to implement the first best optimum in the 
Harris-Todaro model. In particular, there exists a uniform wage subsidy given to both 
rural and urban sectors, which yields the optimal first best solution by reducing urban 
unemployment while preventing rural outmigration. Basu (1980) later completed 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan’s analysis by showing that any subsidy above the optimal 
uniform wage subsidy will also yield the social optimum. To a certain extent, this result 
solves the information problem of finding the right subsidy since any sufficiently large 
subsidy will do the job (but at a higher cost)
11. To our knowledge, such policies have not 
been implemented, in part because, they would be very costly. 
 
Policy effects on inequality 
 
Given the established link between urbanization and inequality in developing countries 
(which mirrors Kuznets’ famous hypothesis that inequality first increases and then 
                                                 
11 Strikingly, all these papers consider the case of exogenously financed policies. For papers that investigate 
the implications of financing policies in Todarian models, see Heady (1987 and 1988) and McCool (1982).   16
decreases with development, see Anand and Kanbur, 1985, Gupta, 1988, Chakravarty and 
Dutta, 1990, and Rauch, 1993), it is also important to understand the potential effects of 
policies on inequality in a Todarian framework.
12 In this respect, the most transparent 
work is probably that of Fields (2005) who gauges the effects on inequality of three main 
policy options (‘rural job creation’, ‘urban job creation’, and ‘urban wage limitation’) in a 
standard Harris-Todaro model by looking at their effects on Lorenz curves, intersectoral 
wage differentials, and on a class of social welfare functions combining measures of both 
earnings and inequality. The most robust analytic result is that the creation of rural jobs 
has beneficial effects on all the dimensions considered. This is different from job creation 
in the urban sector which increases the number of high wage jobs on the one hand, but 
increases unemployment and earnings inequality on the other hand. Finally, the effect of 
an urban wage limitation is ambiguous: it mechanically reduces labor incomes and can 
raise inequality if the demand for labor is sufficiently elastic. These ambiguous results 
show the fragility of inequality analyses in such models. As Fields puts it, ‘how 
distributional concerns are brought into the policy analysis can and does make an 
important difference’. This brings us to a broader critique of the policy implications of 
the standard Harris Todaro model. 
 
2.2.3) Critiques of the standard Harris-Todaro model and its policy implications  
 
The Todaro Paradox conveyed the message that internal migration can be harmful 
because it exacerbates urban unemployment. Given the high unemployment rates and 
significant migration to cities in developing countries, this idea has certainly inspired 
many governments to implement restrictive policies even though the empirical validity of 
the Harris-Todaro model and of the Todaro paradox are not clearly established. In any 
case, the Harris-Todaro model suffers from theoretical oversimplifications, among which 
several are likely to overestimate the link between migration and urban unemployment. 
The critiques revolve around six major points: 
                                                 
12 In the Harris-Todaro model, since (2.3) ensures that migrants and non-migrants have the same expected 
or ex-ante utility, analyses of inequality focus on ex-post utility, which is the utility governments should 
naturally feel concerned about.   17
(1) The Harris-Todaro framework is only a static model describing migration, 
which is a dynamic phenomenon by nature. Even though the model can be thought of as 
representing a steady state equilibrium, this is a limitation. Furthermore, the formalization 
is made in a partial equilibrium context which greatly weakens the justifications for 
policy recommendations. 
(2) Important aspects are absent from the standard Harris-Todaro model, 
including the probable heterogeneity of migrants which is not accounted for, risk 
aversion which could dampen migration incentives and render the Todaro paradox even 
less likely to occur, the possibility of job search in the urban area from the rural area, the 
possibility of return migration, or the existence of rural unemployment. In fact, the 
Harris-Todaro is almost silent about what happens in the rural areas. 
(3) The assumption that urban workers are either employed in the manufacturing 
sector or unemployed has been criticized as too simplistic even though, in the authors’ 
minds, it was implicit that unemployment could also be interpreted as underemployment 
in the informal sector. Cole and Sanders (1985) have criticized the Harris-Todaro model 
for not explicitly modeling the subsistence sector employing uneducated migrants, 
arguing that it flawed the job selection process and expected income calculations if, by 
lack of qualification, uneducated migrants could not find a job in the modern urban 
sector.  
(4) The job rationing mechanism or hiring model hypothesized is not realistic. In 
particular, assuming random job selection in each period overestimates the likelihood of 
finding a job. Stiglitz (1974) suggests that the employment probability might vary in a 
non-monotonic way with the duration of the stay in the city: it could increase in the first 
periods when migrants form social networks in the city, and then decrease in the later 
periods because of deteriorating human capital or because of bad signaling. 
(5) The Harris-Todaro model assumes that the urban wage is exogenously set 
above the endogenous rural wage since it must be that w > f’R(LR) for (2.3) to hold. The 
assumption that wages are high find several explanations ranging from the existence of 
trade unions to the agglomeration of economic activities.
13 It is confirmed in practice, 
                                                 
13 Economic Geography has shown that agglomeration in the manufacturing sector in a context of 
increasing returns to production and imperfect competition produces high real wages (the large local   18
since wages are often reported three to four times higher in urban areas than in rural areas 
(Todaro, 2000). What is more problematic, however, is the assumption that the urban 
wage is fixed, especially in the presence of an informal sector as typical of many 
developing economies. In fact, the argument of a minimum wage should only hold for 
low wages in the formal sector, unless remunerations in the informal sector align 
themselves with those in the formal sector (due to the competition for labor between 
employers).
14 In addition, the wage in the Harris-Todaro model is not related to 
unemployment in any manner. If the urban wage tends to decrease with an increase in the 
unemployment rate as argued by Hoddinott (1996) in his study on urban African labor 
markets, then this would tend to reduce the expected earnings differential in the transition 
towards the equilibrium in the model. This gives another reason why migration flows 
could be overestimated, making the Todaro paradox even less likely to occur. 
(6) The assumption of migration led by expected income differentials may 
overlook other important elements in the migration decision. In particular, it has been 
observed that migration can occur even when the urban expected income is below the 
rural income, which is clearly inconsistent with the income differential approach adopted 
by the Harris-Todaro model (see Katz and Stark 1986a). 
 
In view of these critiques, the policy implications derived from the Harris-Todaro model  
-- i.e. to restrict the rural to urban migration --  are much weaker. In particular, there are 
several reasons that qualify the justifications of restrictive migration policies. First, 
Todarian models only focus on urban labor markets whereas national governments 
should be concerned with whether overall national employment (i.e. including rural 
areas) has improved. Second, as observed by Stark (1991), in a general equilibrium 
perspective, the migration of labor between rural and urban areas may reflect a 
disequilibrium in another market, for instance poorly-functioning capital markets in rural 
areas, which can induce migration and should therefore be addressed. Third, it cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                 
market leads to high nominal wages and the diversity of goods to a low price index, see Fujita, Krugman 
and Venables, 2001).  
14 Evidence on whether labor markets in developing countries are segmented is mixed. Whereas Heckman 
and Hotz (1986, on Panama) or Pradhan and van Soest (1995, on Bolivia) find that the return on individual 
characteristics differs across the formal and the informal sectors, Magnac (1991, on Colombia), Maloney 
(1999, on Mexico) or Pratap and Quintin (2005, on Argentina) do not reject the competitive assumption 
hypothesis.   19
ruled out that migration may have a positive impact on rural areas, possibly by raising 
productivity, allowing exchanges with urban areas, and generating income for rural 
development. Fourth, restrictions to rural-urban migration could prove very harmful. We 
have seen that in the perspective of the Lewis model, migration controls are limitations of 
the labor market which may prevent developing countries from launching labor-intensive 
industries which could, in turn, alleviate poverty. Last but not least, mobility is a basic 
human right, and depriving people of that right is difficult to justify. The only economic 
justification for restricting migration flows would be that migrants do not internalize the 
possibly negative externalities they exert. In any case, this judgment would not require an 
eradication of migration but a regulation of the phenomenon to bring it to a socially 
desirable level. 
 
2.2.4) Extensions of the Harris-Todaro model and their policy implications 
 
To address the problems encountered with the Harris-Todaro formalization, several 
extensions have been proposed. How important are these changes? How do they affect 
policy justifications? 
 
Given that the Lewis model focused on surplus labor in rural areas and the Todarian 
models focused on urban unemployment, one natural extension of the Harris-Todaro 
model is to include a different specification for the rural sector. For instance, Khandker 
and Rashid (1994) consider a dual economy model inspired from Bhatia (1979) in which 
there is surplus labor in agriculture so that workers are paid their average product. There 
are now two pools of redundant labor: unemployed workers in the urban area and 
agricultural surplus labor. In this context, the authors obtain that a manufacturing wage 
subsidy may reduce surplus labor while increasing open unemployment.  
 
Other extensions have tried to model a more realistic labor market. In this respect, Fields 
(1975) makes several modifications which all tend to reduce the unemployment rate 
predicted by the model. In particular, when allowing for urban job search from the rural 
area, workers have less incentives to migrate. Similarly, the introduction of a transitional   20
informal sector makes it possible for migrants to work while searching for a modern 
sector job. The effect of introducing worker heterogeneity is more elaborate. If better-
educated workers are always hired, preferential hiring reduces the number of jobs 
available to uneducated workers and thus reduces the migration incentives for uneducated 
rural workers.  
 
The third set of extensions have endogenized the urban wage by resorting to a Nash-
bargaining between urban firms and a trade union (Calvo, 1978) or in an efficiency-wage 
setting to reduce labor turnover (Stiglitz, 1974), or to deter shirking (Moene, 1988). 
Without delving into a technical discussion, it is sufficient to mention that in contrast to 
the standard Harris-Todaro model, endogenizing urban wages makes wage subsidies 
inappropriate. In the Stiglitz model, a wage subsidy in the urban sector is partially shifted 
and always increases the unemployment rate. In the Calvo model, a wage subsidy has 
little impact on the urban-rural wage differential and thus tends to be less efficient than in 
the standard Harris-Todaro framework. Contrary to Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974)’s 
finding that migration restrictions are not needed, migration barriers now become 
necessary to attain a first-best optimum.  
 
A fourth set of extensions looks at the interplay between migration and the urban land-
market in a Harris-Todaro perspective. Brueckner and Zenou (1999) add an urban land 
market to a standard static Harris-Todaro framework and model the urban area as a 
monocentric city with an endogenous population. Following an exogenous shock such as 
a modern sector enlargement or an increase in the urban wage, the unemployment rate 
and thus the probability of being employed is not the only force that restores the 
equilibrium: land prices also respond to changes and help close the gap between rural 
utility and the expected utility of urban residents. In this model, formal-sector growth 
does not necessarily induce migration: enlarging the formal sector causes land rents to 
rise, which may depress a potential migrant’s expected utility in spite of his better 
chances of finding a job. When this is the case, the overall urban population, and thus the 
informal sector, must shrink to restore the migration equilibrium. 
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All these extensions show that modifying the Harris-Todaro framework alters the 
working of the model and its policy implications.
15 For instance, Fields’ results suggest 
that any policy affecting the search efficiency of workers has implication on their 
employment but also on their migration behavior. The Khandker and Rashid model 
stresses that governments should be concerned with the overall employment effects of 
internal migration (which the standard Harris-Todaro model does not allow) and not with 
urban employment only. But the modeling of the labor market seems difficult to refine 
further. Because of their twist towards an analysis of urban unemployment, Todarian 
models miss several important issues related to migration. Not surprisingly, the models 
which have appeared since the 1980s depart from that setting and present internal 
migration in a much different light.  
 
2.3 The potentially beneficial role of migration in recent models 
 
Recent models of internal migration adopt a complete change in perspective as they do 
not pretend to explain urban unemployment as in the Harris-Todaro framework. Their 
contributions belong to three categories that provide a better explanation of migration 
selectivity, a finer analysis of job-search, or that focus on the role of migration on rural 
development.  
 
2.3.1) More elaborate explanations of migration selectivity -- who chooses to migrate 
 
The most investigated issue in the literature is clearly the ‘Who migrates’ question, which 
can be more complex than it seems. The New Economics of Migration has provided 
subtle analyses on this issue, stressing the role of information asymmetries, incomplete 
insurance and credit markets, or relative deprivation. 
 
                                                 
15 Other extensions have used the Harris-Todaro framework to study trade and growth-related issues. 
Capital mobility has been introduced in a Harris-Todaro framework in order to study the complex interplay 
between migration and capital imbalances (see Corden and Findlay, 1975, Khan, 1980, Beladi and Naqvi, 
1988) or how migration responded to tariffs protecting an import-competing manufacturing sector (see 
Beladi and Marjit, 1996). Growth models also integrated Todarian frameworks. In this respect, Bencivenga 
and Smith (1995) modeled the link between the fluctuations of capital/labor ratio in urban manufacturing 
and rural-urban migration and were able to explain cycling migration flows as well as long periods of 
sustained growth interrupted by a sudden recession.   22
Migration takes place in a world of imperfect information that can account for the sorting 
of migrants according to their skills. A series of models initially focusing on selectivity in 
international migration apply in principle to internal migration as well. In these works, 
the key assumption is that information about skills does not flow freely across labor 
markets. If we assume with Katz and Stark (1984) that employers in a home region 
(which we will interpret as the rural area of origin) have better information on workers’ 
productivity than employers in a host region (which we will interpret as an urban area), 
skilled workers may not find it beneficial to migrate. This is because skilled workers 
would be paid a lower wage in the host region (equal to their group’s average 
productivity) than in their home region where their skills are recognized. However, when 
skilled-migrants can signal themselves to employers in the host region by incurring a 
moderate fixed cost, they will now find it beneficial to migrate (Katz and Stark,1986b). 
Assuming that wage patterns are not linear in skills, this framework can generate the 
migration of high and low-skilled groups with middle-skill groups not migrating (Katz 
and Stark, 1987). 
 
Other works have focused on alternative motivations to migrate which can contradict the 
view that the expected income differentials between urban and rural areas necessarily has 
to be positive in order to induce migration.
16 The paradox can be explained when 
migration entails a small chance of reaping a very high reward. For instance, when utility 
is assumed to increase with comparative wealth or with the ranking of the individual in 
the income distribution of his group of reference, a very risk averse worker facing only a 
small expected increase in his wealth if he migrates, can still choose to migrate to the city 
if the possible wealth increase greatly increases his social status among rural residents 
and migrants (Stark, 1984, Katz and Stark, 1986a).
17 This model predicts that rural 
individuals whose income position is in an upward-sloping portion of the income density 
function will be more likely to migrate since they can expect to greatly increase their 
social status even with only a small chance of a monetary gain.  
 
                                                 
16 Katz and Stark (1986a) report empirical findings that cast doubt on the expected positive income 
differential assumption (see Banerjee and Kanbur, 1981, on India, or Garrison, 1982, on Mexico).  
17 The same individual facing the same conditions would not migrate if utility only depended on income.   23
2.3.2) The job-search approach -- when and how to migrate 
 
Rural to urban migration is job-related in its nature so it is natural to study migration in a 
detailed job-search framework which allows to model migration and job-search as joint 
decisions. Migration models with job-search can account for a variety of patterns 
including the differences in unemployment duration among migrants, the choice of repeat 
or return migration, the diversity of search choices, or the selection of migrants to 
particular destination areas. 
 
With a view to explain unemployment duration among migrants, Harris and Sabot (1982) 
describe a job-search mechanism in which migrants are confronted with a distribution of 
job offers with different wages. Ignoring the exact distribution, migrants decide whether 
to accept a job offer upon a subjective distribution they have in mind. Workers with 
pessimistic expectations have lower reservation wages and do not stay unemployed very 
long. 
 
Vishwanath (1991) models a continuous lifetime program of search and migration 
assuming that rural individuals have three options involving different information flows 
and search costs: (i) stay in the rural area forever, (ii) engage in rural-based search for an 
urban job, or (iii) move to the city and engage in urban-based search. Once employed in 
the city, workers can then choose to engage in on-the-job search or not. This framework 
provides yet another explanation of the income differential paradox since migration can 
be rational even if the mean urban wage is below the rural income. This is because, when 
viewed in the context of a continuous program of job search, the dispersion in the 
distribution of job offers (for a given mean wage) increases the value from urban-based 
search and migration.  
 
Repeat and return migration can be obtained in models with job-search and incomplete 
information such as in Bhattacharya (1990) where workers have to move to a particular 
location in order to be able to observe the quality of jobs offered at that location. In a life 
cycle perspective, Dustmann (1997) models return migration by assuming that a worker   24
can migrate with the intention of raising his total consumption possibilities but planning 
to come back for home consumption after an optimal period of time spent in the 
destination area. 
 
The direction and the intensity of population movements is accounted for in a job-search 
perspective by Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996) who consider a dynamic 
migration model in which migrants already settled in the destination area exert a positive 
externality on potential migrants such that the moving costs between regions decrease 
with the pool of previous migrants.
18 In steady state, the endogenous cost of migration is 
simply equal to the present discounted value of the wage differential between any two 
locations. Because of the externality in the migration cost, migration occurs gradually 
over time with individuals whose moving costs are low migrating first. Interestingly, 
there is no simple relation between migration and regional wage differences as in the 
standard migration theory. In particular, migration can accelerate while income 
differentials narrow if the externality becomes sufficiently strong. Because the positive 
externality is not internalized by agents, there is too little migration compared to the 
optimum, and it may even be that a socially efficient migration never starts. Based on this 
model, there is thus room for public interventions to help workers migrate, for instance 
by subsidizing migration or by improving information flows to villages. Furthermore, 
policies directed towards helping early migrants are Pareto-improving whereas poorer 
area development may halt out-migration and widen long-term interregional income 
differences.  
 
The idea that migration is good and therefore should be encouraged is even more clearly 
defended in general equilibrium settings such as Ortega (2000) who proposes a search-
matching model with two separate labor-markets which differ structurally: one region 
(which we shall interpret as the urban area) offers a better environment than the other one 
to the extent that it has a lower exogenous job separation rate. Unemployed workers can 
                                                 
18 There are several justifications for this assumption: (i) Migrants often send job and housing market 
information back home; (ii) They often help later migrants to find a job, accommodation, or to set up a 
business; (iii) For new migrants, the presence of previous migrants lower the cost of adapting to an alien 
environment, culture, or language.    25
either search for a job in their region of origin or in the other region but incurring a 
migration cost. This framework yields multiple equilibria and the author shows that the 
migration equilibrium –from the disadvantaged to the advantaged region– Pareto-
dominates the no-migration equilibrium. This is because the better structural 
characteristics of the host region allow migrants to benefit from better employment 
prospects while natives also benefit from the labor demand boost following migration. In 
the wake of Ortega’s paper, Sato (2004) proposes a search model with rural-urban 
migration that incorporates frictional urban unemployment and an endogenous urban 
wage determined by Nash-bargaining. Under certain conditions (when the bargaining 
power of workers is low), the model’s equilibrium is one of urban labor scarcity in which 
the urban sector has too many firms and too few workers. A policy which enhances rural 
to urban migration will then increase welfare. 
 
Policy implications -- Governments have a role to encourage migration in a job search 
framework, because they can  increase the efficiency of job matches  in the  internal 
migration process, since migrants can make suboptimal choices due to imperfect 
information. This rationale underpins policies (i) in developed countries, such as the Job 
Search and Relocation Assistance program implemented by the U.S. Department of 
Labor which offers information on out-of-area jobs, job-search grant funds and relocation 
grants (see Mueller, 1981), and (ii) in developing countries, such as China’s regional 
programs to match urban jobs and rural migrants (as in the Qimba mountain project).  
 
2.3.3) Migration’s positive effect on rural development 
 
Probably the most important contribution of the New Migration Economics is to provide 
new insights into the potentially positive link between internal migration and rural 
development, stressing the role of  remittances sent to the rural area. 
 
Stark and Levhari (1982) who focus on migration as a family strategy, present migration 
of a family member as a way to diversify the risks associated with family earnings in the 
absence of a rural insurance market and/or when income diversification opportunities in   26
rural areas are scarce. The analysis is carried further by Stark and Lucas (1988) who 
consider that migration of a family member can result from a cooperative arrangement 
struck between the migrant and his family. Both parties are risk averse but incur different 
risks at different times, which makes co-insurance mutually advantageous. The migrant is 
insured by his family while looking for a job. Later on, the family can engage in the 
adoption of a new agricultural technology knowing that the migrant will be able to 
compensate adverse shocks.  
 
Internal migration might also enable the financing of productive investments in rural 
areas to circumvent credit market imperfections. This can also explain the paradox of 
migration in spite of an expected negative income differential (Katz and Stark, 1986a): if 
the return on investment in the rural area increases with the level of the investment (for 
instance with the adoption of modern techniques), then it might be rational for a rural 
resident to migrate to an urban area even if it involves a lower expected wage income. 
This is because even a small chance of getting some additional income in the city will 
enable a very profitable investment in the rural area. Interestingly, this predicts that 
migration flows could originate from regions with a high production potential but with 
capital market imperfections whereas the Harris-Todaro model would only predict 
migration from regions with a low production potential. 
 
Policy implications -- The implications of these models is that policies should ensure 
that the role played by migration on rural development is optimized. This covers a 
multitude of potential interventions and programs, such as helping migrants send 
remittances home, helping rural recipients allocate remittances for rural development by 
directing them towards more productive investments, and even interventions that enable 
migrants to keep social links with their areas of origin
19, not just to transfer remittances 
but also to transfer other resources such as information.  
 
                                                 
19In China it has been suggested that a way of maintaining such links would be to allow migrants to retain 
certain rural residency and land rights in addition to those they may have in their area of destination (Ping 
and Pieke, 2003). 
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An interesting implication of these models is that policies could also target those among 
poor families who do not have migrant members given that these families have less 
opportunities to escape poverty. For instance, micro-finance programs in rural areas 
could target non-migrant households who do not receive remittances to offset credit 
constraints, or who may not have access to the networks that provide services to 
wealthier migrant households.  
 
3 EMPIRICAL MODELS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The previous section has shown that the diversity of theoretical formalizations does not 
deliver a single message on internal migration, even though the most recent contributions 
provide a rather positive message on the role of internal migration. Unfortunately, the 
empirical literature does not provide structural tests of these models but only partial 
findings that can support or invalidate intuitions and, in that sense only, support or 
invalidate the policy implications of the models.  
 
We now turn to another strand of the literature -- that based on empirical / 
econometrically estimated relationships to see if they strengthened the foundations of 
different policy interventions.  This live picture relies on the income differential approach 
to explain migration choices. But specifications are more ad hoc, lacking equilibriating 
mechanisms found in the theoretical formulations.  The organizational structure of this 
section first addresses motivations and then consequences of the migration process. 
 
3.1 The decision to migrate 
 
An abundant empirical literature has tried to identify the determinants of the migration 
decision given that migration responds to spatial differences in utilities, mainly due to 
spatial differences in incomes net of migration costs. In the 1960s and 1970s, many 
works tried to explain the flows of internal migration using aggregate data. The approach 
consisted in estimating ‘modified gravity models’ of migration inspired by Newton’s law 
of gravitation which depicted migrating flows as directly related to the size of 
populations at the origin and the destination, and inversely related to distance. These   28
modified gravity models also considered the effects of the push and pull factors in both 
areas of origin and destination. Today, this approach -- which can only broadly describe 
population movements -- has been replaced by finer micro-econometric methods.
20  
 
The simple approach: the binary model 
 
The typical migration equation at the micro level specifies a binary variable (moving 
versus staying) as function of a set of regressors. This approach focuses on the decision to 
migrate of individuals originally located in a given area. In this perspective, migration 
choice can usually be modeled either with a linear probability, a probit or a logit model. 
In binary-choice models, migrating is a dummy (Yi = 1(Yi
*>0)) where Yi
* is a latent 
variable specified as a function of a set of explanatory individual characteristics Xi and an 
unobserved effect εi such that: 
 
 Y i
* = Xi.α+ εi (3.1) 
 
This should be considered as a reduced-form approach implying that one should be 
cautious about interpreting the coefficients in the absence of a structural model. For 
instance, consider a case where age is included in (3.1) as an explanatory variable in the 
vector Xi. If age simultaneously has an effect on outcome differences (for instance if 
younger people gain more in wages from migrating) as well as on moving costs (for 
instance if younger people incur lower moving costs), then one may not be able to tell 
whether individuals in different age groups exhibit different migration behaviors because 
they are confronted with different opportunities or because their migration costs differ. 
This identification problem calls for a more relevant specification of opportunity 
differences. Several studies in the past, have tried to include the difference in regional-
aggregate variables in (3.1) such as the unemployment rate differential Ar(i) between the 
region of origin r of an individual i and all other potential regions of destination as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
20 More details on gravity models can be found in Greenwood (1997).   29
 Y i
* = Xi.α + Ar(i).β + εi (3.2) 
 
However, this specification is not satisfying: the proxy for opportunity differences would 
be the same for all individuals originally residing in the same region, even if they do not 
have the same individual characteristics. Hence, part of the identification problem 
remains. One way to deal with this could be to compute conditional aggregate variables 
(for instance the unemployment rate of women interacted with a gender dummy) or to 
directly interact individual characteristics with regional-aggregate differences: one could 
then investigate for instance whether educated individuals are more responsive to 
differences in cultural amenities. But the assumption that all individuals originating from 
the same region face the same opportunity differences Ar(i)  upon migration remains, 
which is not a desirable feature. For instance, including the regional differences in 
average wages in (3.2) is not desirable because individuals may face job opportunities 
yielding individual-specific wages. 
 
A structural improvement 
 
The literature has found other ways to solve the identification problem, by specifying 
simultaneously a wage equation for moving (3.3’), a wage equation for staying (3.3’’), 
and a migration equation (2.3) as a function of wage differences (wm,i - ws,i) and other 
individual characteristics Xi. Now, the difference in wages is individual-specific and is 
believed to capture regional differences in individual opportunities,  while individual 
variables can account for moving cost heterogeneity. The system of equations can be 
written as follows: 
 
 Y i
* = Xi.α + γ.(wm,i- ws,i) + εi (3.3) 
 w m,i= Zm,i.δ + εm,i  (3.3’) 
 w s,i= Zs,i.η + εs,i  (3.3’’) 
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It is important to note that, eventhough the wage associated with migration is observed 
only for movers and the home wage is observed only for stayers, the wage wm,i (resp. ws,i) 
must reflect the potential wage associated with migrating (resp. with staying) for the 
whole sample and not just for movers (resp. stayers). If the migration-wage equation were 
only estimated on the subsample of movers, the estimated coefficients would probably be 
biased because of selection issues. There are two methods to overcome this problem. The 
first method, is to apply the two-stage Heckman method as originally done by Nakosteen 
and Zimmer (1980) and Robinson and Tomes (1982) for developed countries. 
Surprisingly this method has only recently been applied to analysis in developing 
countries in papers such as Lanzona (1998) on the Philippines, Agesa (2001) on Kenya, 
or Tunali (2000) on Turkey. The second method is to estimate the equations 
simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
21 This structural improvement is not only a 
matter of econometric rigor, failure to adjust income gains for selectivity can lead to a 
severe bias: Islam and Choudhury (1990) find that not correcting for selectivity 
underestimates the internal migration impacts of income gains in Canada.  
 
Accounting for multiple destinations 
 
One shortcoming of the above specifications is that they group all potential destinations 
in a single ‘rest of the world’ destination. Of course, this is often due to the lack of 
available and measurable data, and because multivariate analyses are often less tractable. 
However, this is really problematic since individuals face a set of different potential 
migration destinations with different local opportunities. It is intuitive that workers may 
not only decide whether to migrate but also decide where to migrate; they may even 
make these choices simultaneously. Some papers address this issue by considering 
                                                 
21 Three remarks are in order. First, for the model to be identified, exclusion restrictions are needed for the 
variable sets Xi and Zi. In other words, one needs variables in Zi that are not in Xi and variables in Xi that 
are not in Zi. Variables in Zi only allow for variation in the wage difference holding fixed individual 
characteristics in the migration decision. This allows to identify γ (for more details on exclusion restrictions 
and relevant estimation strategies, see Gobillon and Leblanc, 2003). Second, our discussion has focused on 
wages, whereas a more correct approach could be to consider expected incomes (which would also require 
modelling the individual’s expected probability of finding a job). Third, the selection of working versus 
non-working among migrants should also be corrected for (see Tunali, 2000, or Agesa, 2001).   31
polychotomous choice models, usually multinomial logits. The general specification of 
such models can be written as follows: 
 
  r(i) = Argmax (Vi,r) (3.4) 
 V i,r = Xi.αr + β.wi,r + μi,r (3.4’) 
 w i,r = Zi,r.γr + νi,r (3.4’’) 
 
where Vi,r is the indirect utility of individual i if locating in region r, and r(i) is the chosen 
location. In this model, the individual compares utilities across locations and rationally 
chooses the location yielding the highest utility level. The utility at a given place is a 
function of the individual and location-specific wage, as well as of moving costs which 
depend on individual variables (through Xi in (3.4’)). In this setting, migration is 
triggered by regional differences in the return on observed characteristics (Zi,r in (3.4’’) 
for characteristics valued by the labor market, or Xi in (3.4’) for other characteristicss) or 
unobserved characteristics (affecting μi,r or νi,r). For instance, if one considers how wages 
can affect migration, regions might have different returns on education (as in Dahl, 2002) 
or different returns on unobserved characteristics. Migration can also be triggered by 
idiosyncratic shocks, affecting νi,r in (3.4’’) such as good job opportunities that yield a 
wage bonus. 
 
This type of model is used by Falaris (1987) who estimates a nested logit of individual 
internal migration across 23 states in Venezuela grouped in 7 regions. Distance between 
states is used as a proxy for moving costs. The model is estimated in three stages: The 
author first estimates the probability Pj of choosing a state j by decomposing that 
probability into the probability of choosing state j conditionally on being in region k and 
the probability Pk of choosing region k, both probabilities having a logit specification. He 
is then able to estimate state-specific equations on the subsample of in-migrants, 
correcting for sample selection bias, using Lee (1983)’s method. Finally, the wage 
equations are used to impute a potential real wage for each person in each state. He is 
then able to estimate the structural version of the nested logit model (of the form (3.4)   32
and (3.4’)) using these imputed wages. In accordance with the theory, he finds that wage 
differentials do indeed affect migration decisions in Venezuela.
22  
 
These improved approaches still have the drawback that they assume that individuals 
have all the information necessary to compute the different utility levels associated with 
the different migration choices.
23 They also raise a variety of econometric issues, most of 
them linked to the imperfection of available data (see the Appendix for more details).  
 
3.2 The consequences of migration 
 
A second strand of the internal migration empirical literature in developing countries 
focuses on the consequences of migration. Do migrants gain from migrating? Is 
migration beneficial for rural areas, for urban areas, or even for the economy as a whole? 
 
3.2.1) Consequences of migration for the individual 
 
To check whether migrants really improve their situation by migrating, the empirical 
literature has mainly tried to estimate the monetary returns to migration focusing on wage 
comparisons (current earnings being considered as a proxy for the stream of future 
income) or on the dynamics of migrants’ wages. 
 
 
                                                 
22 One reason to use a nested logit instead of a standard multinomial logit is to attenuate the problems 
caused by the property of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (iia hereafter) as necessarily assumed in 
this type of models. Indeed, with Falaris’ approach, one needs to assume iia across regions and across 
states within given regions, but not across states in different regions, which is less constraining but not 
completely realistic. Focusing on internal migration in the United States, Dahl (2002) uses a more general 
approach which completely gets rid of the iia problem. Dahl proposes a novel methodological approach 
also relying on the estimation of a wage equation for a subsample of migrants and correcting for selection 
bias. However, the location choice process does not need to be specified: the probability of migrating from 
one state to another state is estimated non-parametrically using the frequency estimator for individuals 
sharing the same characteristics, namely education and age. This comes down to assuming that individuals 
with the same characteristics are affected in the same way by the determinants of migration. The main 
advantage of the method is that it allows one to estimate individual migration decisions even in the 
presence of numerous potential destinations. 
23 This may not always be true, especially in developing countries, and could reduce the explanatory power 
of these estimations. It might thus be worth thinking about alternative specifications that would take into 
account the imperfect information of potential migrants.   33
Estimating the gains from migration 
 
Several approaches can be used to measure the change in remuneration associated with 
migration. With cross section data, it is possible to build counterfactuals and compare the 
earnings of migrants with the earnings they would have had, had they not moved. This 
can be done by computing a wage when staying and when moving, using equations (3.3’) 
and (3.3’’) and correcting for selection bias. The difference between the two potential 
wages can be said to account for the effect of migration on wages. 
 
Observe that with panel data, it is also possible to directly estimate whether migrants gain 
from migration by taking advantage of the panel dimension. One approach is simply to 
regress the change in earnings between two dates as a function of personal characteristics 
(or changes in personal characteristics) and migrant status:
24 
 
  Δwi = Xi.α + β.Mi + εi (3.5) 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, studies usually measure a gain associated with 
migration but it does not have to be the case given the possibility of an income 
differential paradox which has workers migrate in spite of a lower wage in the area of 
destination (Vishwanath, 1991, Katz and Stark, 1986a). One important reason can be that 
workers incur a short term loss in their income but a long term gain. This justifies studies 
that focus on the assimilation of migrants in a dynamic perspective when longitudinal 
data are available. 
 
Estimating the extent and speed of labor-market assimilation in the place of 
destination 
 
                                                 
24 The advantage of differencing a cross-section model (variables in the RHS of (3.5) are then expressed as 
differences) is that it can wipe out fixed effects potentially correlated with the error term in the cross-
section regression of wages, thus removing a potential endogeneity problem of nonlongitudinal data, and 
justifying differenced estimations without having to control for selection. However, an endogenity problem 
may remain even after differencing if there is some selection on individual residuals.   34
To investigate the dynamics of migrants’ wages, the study of reference is Borjas, Bronars 
and Trejo (1992) who focus on interstate movements in the United States. After 
constructing a migrant dummy for individuals who changed states during the period 
considered, the authors regress the logarithm of workers’ wages as follows: 
 
 ln  wi = Xi.β + γ1.Ei + γ2.Ei
2 +δ0.Mi + δ1.Mi.T + δ2.Mi.T
2 + εi (3.6) 
 
where wi is the wage, Xi is a vector of personal characteristics, Mi is a dummy variable for 
migrants, Ei is the duration of labor market experience, Ti is years since migration and εi 
is a random error term. In a regression such as (3.6), one should expect to find δ0 < 0, 
measuring the initial disadvantage of migrants (since migrants can only partially transfer 
their region or firm-specific knowledge when migrating), and δ1 > 0, capturing the pace 
at which migrants catch-up with non-migrants. δ2 < 0 expresses a slowing-down in the 
convergence.
25 The authors explicitly do not include any job characteristics in (3.6) 
because they argue that the process of assimilation precisely involves job mobility: they 
want to compare the earnings of migrants and non-migrants for the same type of jobs, but 
to account for the better job matches of migrants over time.
26 As hypothesized, Borjas et 
al. show that internal migrants initially earn less than natives but experience a higher 
growth rate so that the wage differential disappears after a few years. The initial 
disadvantage of migrants increases with the distance migrated, reflecting an increasing 
mismatch in job-specific experience. 
 
Other studies that try to open up the black box of post-migration labor-market 
assimilation and to identify the key factors of success are scarce. Friedberg (2000) 
replicates Borjas et al.’s methodology to study the assimilation of migrants to Israel. She 
shows that human capital acquired abroad is only partially transferable, and that more 
educated migrants have a faster assimilation rate, which suggests that immigrants could 
                                                 
25 As otherwise standard in wage equations, one should also expect to observe γ1>0 and γ2<0 reflecting a 
positive but concave effect of experience on wages. The vector β measures how the market values personal 
characteristics. 
26 In a situation where it is believed that the catching-up process occurs through pay raises, it would be 
necessary to control for job characteristics. In developing countries, given the mixed evidence on labor-
market segmentation, it is not clear what pattern of labor-market assimilation prevails.   35
benefit from further training following immigration. Yamauchi (2004) investigates the 
differences in labor-market assimilation between educated and non-educated internal 
migrants to Bangkok. Interacting education with destination experience (defined as the 
time spent in Bangkok) yields a positive coefficient, suggesting that educated migrants 
are able to raise their wages by accumulating effective experience at the place of 
destination faster than uneducated migrants.
27  
 
Measuring the effect of social interactions and social networks in facilitating 
migration and assimilation 
 
A series of papers look at whether social networks play a key role in migration and labor-
market assimilation. To study how the labor outcomes of migrants are affected by their 
social networks, a simple and straightforward approach is simply to introduce variables in 
(3.6) such as the percentage of migrants of same rural origin residing at the place of 
destination. However, the existing works adopt a different approach. 
 
In their study of migration to Bangkok, Yamauchi and Tanabe (2003) run a probit model 
on the employment probability of new migrants (defined as those who have stayed in 
Bangkok less than one year) taking into account individual and household characteristics 
as well as network factors that are specific to the province of origin: the employment 
probability estimated among the group of migrants from a particular area, and the relative 
share of migrants from a particular area in the whole migrant population residing in 
Bangkok. With this method, one needs to distinguish the effect of group-specific 
externalities (the network effect) from correlations between the labor-market outcomes of 
recent and previous migrant groups. Indeed, there could be common unobserved 
characteristics specific to the province of origin or shocks correlated among same-origin 
migrants. This problem is addressed by pooling cross-sections over time and including 
origin-specific fixed effects and origin-specific year shocks. The results show that 
whereas the job-search efficiency of previous migrants increases the probability of 
                                                 
27 Following these works, mirroring the role of general and specific experience, it would be interesting to 
study the difference in the assimilation rate among migrants depending on whether they acquired their 
education before or after migrating.   36
employment of new migrants, the relative size of the migrant population in the local 
labor-market decreases it. They interpret the latter result as a congestion effect among 
migrants competing for jobs. 
 
A criticism of this kind of work is that the potential endogeneity of the social network is 
seldom controlled for. One exception is Munshi (2003) who studies the role of social 
networks in the migration of Mexicans to the United States, using a panel dataset of 
individual location decisions and labor outcomes from multiple communities. In this 
work, the number of other migrants from the same origin-community is instrumented 
with rainfall in the origin-community since rainfall is a push factor that naturally affects 
rain-fed agriculture employment.
28 With this endogeneity control, it is found that an 
individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying job when his 
network is larger.  
 
Policy implications -- These works suggest that education or social networks can help 
migrants in their gradual process of labor-market assimilation in the city even though the 
specific channels through which networks and education operate are not identified. 
These channels probably include different kinds of support or opportunities that migrants 
may lack. In this respect, policies that could help migrants overcome assimilation barriers 
are diverse. Measures can aim at improving the bargaining power of migrants on the 
labor-market, for instance through sharing information and collective negotiation (Mosse 
et al., 2002). Governments can see to it that migrants, and especially poor migrants, are 
not credit rationed so that entrepreneurship is not discouraged, that migrants are not 
discriminated against in the housing market, and that they find a satisfactory access to 
public goods, including child care, health and education.
29 Supporting the political 
involvement of migrants in local politics can help migrants ensure that their needs are 
taken into account by local policy makers. Several other measures can ensure the 
protection of rural migrants in cities, providing them with information on labor 
legislation and rights, favoring their unionization, and ensuring that they hold written 
                                                 
28 This instrument may nevertheless be less relevant when agriculture is irrigated in rural areas. 
29 In China for instance, rural migrants still face strong obstacles to access healthcare services (Shaokang, 
Zhenwei and Blas, 2002) or to educate their children (China Daily, 2003).   37
contracts. Welfare funds can provide insurance to the most vulnerable migrants. Other 
measures can guarantee to preserve the rights of migrants in the rural area of origin while 
away. 
 
3.2.2) Consequences of migration for the rural area of origin 
 
Besides the effect of migration on the migrants themselves, empirical work has also 
investigated how migration affects the families of migrants and the rural areas of origin. 
In theory, rural to urban migration can potentially affect rural areas in two ways: by 
removing the migrant’s labor, income and expenditures from his original location (the 
direct effect of migration), and by generating transfers between the migrant and his 
family (the effect of remittances). The latter effect can be measured at the individual level 
for stayers receiving remittances, as well as at the community level if the focus is on 
inequality or poverty. Not surprisingly, whether the departure of migrants to the city 
improves or not the livelihood of those who stay in the rural areas is theoretically 
ambiguous. On the one hand, internal migration to the city may relieve a strained labor 
market in which labor supply is plethoric and may provide rural inhabitants with 
remittances from their relatives who left for the city. On the other hand, rural to urban 
migrations may have a negative impact on rural areas by removing workers from 
productive rural activities or through externalities of various types, for instance through 
the deterioration of family or community structures, by leaving individuals, especially 
women, in declining rural area with little development prospects. Identifying the net 
effect is however an empirical exercise. 
 
Consequences for families with migrants 
 
Families with migrants may be affected by migration through several channels. The 
simplest approach to measure the effect of migration on families with a migrant is to 
regress an outcome of interest Yi (for instance poverty or child health) on a set of 
explanatory individual characteristics Xi, on a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household 
has a migrant member and 0 if not, and on an error term εi as follows:   38
 
 Y i = Xi.α + β.Mi + εi (3.7) 
 
Since an endogeneity problem is likely to arise in (3.7) in the presence of an omitted 
variable correlated both with migration and with the outcome of interest, OLS 
estimations could be biased. To circumvent this problem, one can resort to instrumental 
variables to predict migration.
30  
 
However, (3.7) is a very reduced form which does not shed much light on the 
mechanisms at work. Many studies prefer to explicitly consider the role of remittances 
which play a key role in the theories of the New Economics of Migration.
31 It would 
therefore be tempting to replace the migrant dummy Mi with the size of the remittances 
received by the family Ri in (3.7), yielding:  
 
 Y i = Xi.α + β.Ri + εi (3.8) 
 
But given possible endogeneity problems (the possibility of omitted variables as in (3.7) 
as well as of reverse causation since an adverse outcome Yi may attract remittances), OLS 
estimates are likely to be biased. Unfortunately, the literature does not seem to have come 
up yet with a valid instrument for remittances.
32 It is thus necessary to resort to other 
estimation strategies to more satisfactorily measure the effect of remittances. One 
example is by Yang and Martinez (2005) who make use of a unique natural experiment to 
study the impact of international remittances: the depreciation of the Philippine peso 
during the 1997 Asian crisis which caused an exogenous variation in the size of 
                                                 
30 For instance, following Woodruff and Zenteno (2001), McKenzie (2005) uses historic migration rates to 
predict current migration. 
31 Remittances are certainly not the only channel through which having a migrant might alter a family’s 
outcome. But it may be the main channel since money transfers can greatly increase the level of household 
expenditures. In Guatemala for instance, it is estimated that households that receive internal remittances 
increase their expenditures by 37.1 percent on average. In comparison, the households that receive 
international remittances increase their expenditures by 39.5 percent, which is of about the same magnitude 
(Adams, 2005). 
32 More details on this problem can be found in McKenzie (2005).   39
remittances received from abroad. Unfortunately, we do not know of a similar natural 
experiment used to study the effect of remittances arising from internal migration. 
 
 
Consequences for income distribution at the place of origin 
 
Several studies investigate whether remittances increase or decrease inequality in rural 
areas. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) compare two Mexican villages: one which has 
had much internal out-migration, and another one which has been subject to more 
international out-migration to Southern California. Using household data, the authors are 
able to simulate the effect of small changes in the different types of income (non-
remittance income, remittances from internal migrants, and remittances from 
international migrants) and to provide a fine analysis of household inequality in each 
village. Obviously, the impact of marginal changes in remittances upon inequality 
depends upon where the recipients of remittances are located within the village income 
distribution, on the share of remittances in village incomes, and on the distribution of 
remittances themselves. The authors find that in the village where many households have 
links with internal migrants, remittances from internal migrants have an equalizing 
impact on the village income distribution, whereas remittances from international 
migrants have an unequalizing impact. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1988) show the 
robustness of these findings using extended Gini decompositions. Other studies on 
Pakistan (Adams, 1994) and the Philippines (Rodriguez, 1998) also find that internal 
migration is more likely to decrease inequality, in contrast to international migration. The 
postulated explanation is the selectivity of migrants among the two types of migration. 
Furthermore, it has also been argued that the effect could also depend on the phase of 
migration when considered over time. Studying international migration from Mexico to 
the United States, McKenzie (2005) finds that when the pool of migrants is small, the 
upper-middle range of the wealth distribution benefit more from migration and 
remittances. When the pool has grown bigger, it gradually benefits poorer individuals. As 
already mentioned, the same is likely to apply to internal migration in developing 
countries since landlord families usually migrate before peasant families during the   40
urbanization process. This is consistent with the idea that inequality in the region of 
origin has an inverse U-shaped relationship with migration. 
 
From an econometric point of view, the study of changes in inequality due to migration 
and remittances can be tricky. An important issue is whether the labor-market 
participation of the rural families receiving remittances is considered to be endogenous or 
not (i.e. whether money transfers are a potential substitute for home earnings or not). If 
this is the case, what should be investigated is how the observed income distribution at 
the place of origin compares to a counterfactual scenario without migration and 
remittances. Barham and Boucher (1998) study this issue using cross-section data from a 
survey of households in a Nicaraguan town with a long history of migration. To build the 
counterfactual scenario, the authors impute the earnings migrants would have had if they 
had remained in town, and what other family members’ decisions would be as regards 
labor participation. They then use the results to impute participation decisions and 
earnings for migrants and non-migrants in migrant households. While simply comparing 
income inequality measured by a Gini index with and without remittances would indicate 
that remittances from internal migration reduce inequality, the comparison to the 
counterfactual scenario shows that, in fact, internal migration increases inequality -- a 
result qualitatively similar to that of international migration. 
 
Consequences for production at the place of origin 
 
Another issue is how migration can affect production at the place of origin. In the case of 
rural surplus labor as postulated in the Lewis model, migration should have no effect on 
production other than through remittances spent on productive investments or because of 
increased demand on rural goods. If labor is not in surplus, labor transfers have to be 
accounted for since the two effects play in opposite directions.  
 
Lucas (1987) uses time series data over a long period to study inter-regional migration in 
Southern Africa (international migration to South Africa’s mines from neighboring 
countries). The econometric model incorporates both the determinants of international   41
migration to South African mines and the economic consequences for neighboring labor-
supplying countries. For each economy, equations are estimated for migration to the 
mines, domestic crop production, cattle accumulation, and estate labor. It is found that, in 
the sending economies, domestic crop production (i.e. production in rural areas) is 
negatively affected by the withdrawal of labor (in the short run), but positively affected 
by investments remitted by migrants (in the long run).  
 
This conclusion is confirmed by the work of Rozelle, Taylor and DeBrauw (1999) on a 
sample of farm households in the northeast of China in the Hebei and Liaoning 
provinces. They find that migration involves labor lost initially which depresses yields, 
but that access to capital through migration-induced remittances increases yields 
eventually. The short run versus long-run distinction is important for analyzing the 
impact of migration on production in the place of origin. 
 
Consequences for human capital and growth at the place of origin 
 
Migration can have a negative effect on the local stock of human capital by removing 
individuals with particular skills, or it can have a positive affect by stimulating 
investment in the acquisition of human capital by potential migrants (Stark and Wang, 
2002). These two effects can act in opposite directions so that the overall effect is a 
matter of empirical investigation. The idea of a ‘beneficial brain drain’ in which 
migration prospects induce investment in human capital has been studied in the case of 
international migration by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) using aggregate cross-
section data for a set of developing countries. In order to control for the endogeneity of 
migration, the authors simultaneously estimate country-specific migration rates, 
investments in human capital and the growth rate of the national economy, using the ex-
post migration rate as a proxy for the ex-ante probability to migrate. The results indicate 
that migration prospects  play an important role in education decisions, but given the use 
of aggregate cross-section data the results should be considered only suggestive at this 
stage.  
   42
In the case of internal migration, Kochar (2004) provides a test using microeconomic 
data. The method consists of estimating how the differences in returns to schooling 
between a rural area and the nearby urban area affects the probability of completing 
middle school for rural boys aged 15-20. The results show that rural schooling decisions 
in India are undertaken in response to the possibility of employment in urban areas. 
 
3.2.3) Consequences of migration for the urban area of destination 
 
To our knowledge, work on the effects of internal migration on the urban area of 
destination is scarce. This contrasts with the more numerous studies of the impact of 
international migration on natives in the host country of destination (for surveys, see 
Borjas, 1999, or Greenwood and McDowell, 1999). But the effects of internal migration 
could differ from those of international migration. In the case of internal migration, the 
absence of an exchange rate makes migration a central equilibriating mechanism for 
regional imbalances in economic activity so that partial equilibrium analysis seems 
inappropriate. Furthermore, because of differences in migrant selectivity (which should 
probably be attributed to differences in migration costs and migration restrictions) and 
because of differences in local economic contexts (the more regulated labor market in 
developed countries versus the less regulated urban labor markets in developing 
countries), the expected effects on the area of destination and their magnitudes should 
also differ. In particular, internal migrants in developing countries are more likely to be 
less skilled than natives in the urban area of destination, whereas international migrants 
might be more or less skilled than the average native in the country of destination. To 
better characterize internal migration flows and stocks, it would be very useful to build 
databases on internal migration by education in a selection of developing countries, 
complementing the work of Docquier and Marfouk (2005) who recently built such a 
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The effect of migration on local wages in the place of destination 
 
The first papers which were concerned with the areas of destination tried to assess or, 
given the difficulty of the task, at least discuss whether the Todaro paradox was verified 
(see Todaro 1976, Garcia-Ferrer, 1980, Saltvatore, 1981, Lucas, 1985). But few works 
have investigated the effect of internal migration on wages in the urban areas of 
destination (one exception is Wrage, 1981, for Canada). 
 
In the Todaro perspective, a migration-induced increase in labor supply could depress 
wages. Intuitively, this effect can be studied at the aggregate level by regressing urban 
wages on migration inflows from rural areas but migration flows should be considered 
endogenous because they respond to differences in regional wage opportunities. To 
correctly estimate this impact, it is necessary to instrument migration flows, for instance 
by using climatic variables at the rural region of origin as noted earlier. Another problem 
is that the labor composition in the urban area changes with migration. This could bias 
the interpretation of the pressure of migration on urban wages attributed to a labor-supply 
increase relative to labor demand. This problem could partly be overcome by segmenting 
migration inflows by migrants’ labor-market observed characteristics. However, 
differences in unobserved characteristics between migrants and natives could still remain. 
In the Lewis perspective or in a New Economic Geography perspective, the story could 
be completely different. Internal migration in developing countries could accompany 
agglomeration and growth in urban areas. The increase in productivity due to increasing 
returns to scale could involve a raise in wages. We do not know of empirical work which 
has tested these issues but this could be a useful direction for future research. 
 
The effect of migration on competition for jobs at the place of destination 
 
Another important and politically sensitive issue is that of the competition for jobs 
between migrants and locals. Do migrants take jobs that would otherwise be held by 
locals? Or, on the contrary, are they self-employed or employed in isolated labor-market 
segments, thus having no direct employment effects on locals? The literature provides   44
only mixed evidence. In the case of China for instance, Knight, Song and Huaibin (1999) 
find that migrants of rural origin hold jobs that non-migrants shun. On the other hand, 
Roberts (2001) mentions the issue of local workers in Shanghai being laid-off by state 
enterprises and competing with migrant laborers in the formal sector.  
 
The effect of migration on poverty at the place of destination 
 
Finally, the effect of internal migration on urban areas is not limited to an impact on 
wages and employment. In a country such as South Africa, migration from poor rural 
areas is often viewed as contributing to a strengthening of residential segregation, an 
increase in the number of poor, and a costly burden on local public services. These issues 
have seldom been studied empirically, probably due to the lack of adequate micro-data.
33 
One exception is Mohtadi (1986) who uses cross sectional data of cities and rural regions 
from Iranian censuses in order to assess how migration from rural areas affects urban 
inequality. Not surprisingly, the finding is that inequality in urban areas tends to increase 
with migration when migrants are from a poorer, landless group, and to decrease when 
they are from a better off, landed group.
34  
 
Policy implications -- The considerations above suggest that the inflow of migrants to 
cities can be problematic if not accommodated properly. Accommodationist policies 
cover programs designed to assist migrants upon their arrival in urban areas in order to 
reduce the economic and social costs of migration and to maximize its gains. The idea is 
to provide rural migrants with an environment that ‘allows them to make use of their 
energy and skills’ (Skeldon, 1997). Measures can be as diverse as the creation of 
reception centers for migrants, helping them access essential public goods, or helping 
them acquire affordable housing (such as the programs launched by the South African 
                                                 
33 There is a real need to measure the characteristics of migrants with respect to age, gender, education, 
health, family structure, ethnicity and poverty at a local level.  Generating  and using localized census data 
and the construction of neighborhood poverty maps at a metropolitan scale could be a prerequisite for 
useful research in the  Future. 
34 This study uses cross sectional data and, therefore, only focuses on short term effects.    45
government to build cheap and affordable houses for rural migrants who have been living 
in shacks at the periphery of cities for years).
35 
 
3.2.4) Consequences of migration for the economy as a whole 
 
  Some empirical studies have been more ambitious and have tried to measure the   
national changes in production, income and inequality resulting from internal migration. 
The issue at stake is whether migration allows workers to move to areas where they are 
more productive and if efficiency gains occur at the cost of rising inequality. From an 
applied point of view, only structural models of internal migration or calibrated 
computable general equilibrium models can pretend to shed some light on this complex 
issue.  
 
Several works have integrated internal migration in their assessment of trade barriers 
reduction. Taylor, Yunez-Naude and Dyer (1999) investigate the impacts of NAFTA on 
rural employment and wages and rural out-migration in Mexico following a reduction in 
the government support price of corn. This is done using a village-town model which 
blends microeconomic household farm models with economywide modeling.
36 The 
model is estimated on survey data from households located in towns and surrounding 
villages in the Michoacan province. The authors find only a small impact of trade 
liberalization. Zhai and Wang (2002) simulate the effects of a reduction in trade barriers 
on rural-urban migration and urban unemployment in China. Their simulations show that 
there is a great need to co-ordinate trade, labor and internal migration policies. In the 
context of trade liberalization measures (a gradual reduction of import tariffs), if rural-
urban migration controls are relaxed (increasing labor mobility) without a labor-market 
                                                 
35 It should be noted, however, that accommodationist policies conceal an important ambiguity. In South 
Africa, there is a tension between preventing ‘land invasions’ (informal settlements appearing on vacant 
land within the city) and helping informal settlers ameliorate their housing conditions. Pakistan facing a 
problem of squatter settlements, was confronted with a similar tension between legalizing such settlements 
and evicting them. A recent Peruvian program aiming at entitling urban squatters with property rights made 
sure that only current squatters could be included in the program and that demands from new squatters 
would be turned down in the future (see Field, 2003). It is doubtful whether such announcements can be 
made to be completely credible. 
36 For computable general equilibrium  techniques used to explore the impacts of policy changes on village 
economies and migration, see Taylor and Adelman (1996).   46
reform (imposing a fully flexible urban wage), then urban unemployment will rise 
dramatically. The authors reach the conclusion that if the relaxation of migration controls 
is accompanied by a full labor-market reform, then China will maximize its gain from 
trade liberalization. 
 
Works that use these models to study the effect of mobility restrictions are scarce. Au and 
Henderson (2006) show that migration restrictions have generated insufficient 
agglomeration in China’s urban areas, resulting in GDP losses. Whalley and Zang (2004) 
investigate the extent to which mobility restrictions in China (the Hukou system) possibly 
contribute to overall income inequality. They propose a simple model in which the 
removal of mobility restrictions reallocates labor across regions so as to equate marginal 
productivities (flexible wages). When migration restrictions are removed, all wage 
differences and most income inequality disappears. Extensions which take into account 
labor efficiency differences across regions or in which urban house price rises retard 
rural-urban migration lead to a smaller reduction in inequality. Hu (2004) simulates a 
spatial agglomeration model to explain the increasing regional disparity between coastal 




This survey has reviewed theoretical and empirical models of internal migration in 
developing countries. On the big question -- should rural to urban migration be 
discouraged, tolerated, or encouraged -- the broad assessment is that restrictions in 
general are not desirable.  
 
In principle, the Todarian models can be used for policy analysis in situations where 
urban unemployment arising from rapid rural to urban migration is a concern.  However, 
the empirical literature has not been convincing in assessing whether the conditions for 
the Todaro paradox were met in the real world.
37  Empirically testing the Harris-Todaro 
model has also been complex so that these tests are no more convincing than the tests for 
                                                 
37 For discussions, see Todaro, 1976, Garcia-Ferrer, 1980, Salvatore, 1981, and Lucas, 1985.   47
the conditions for the Todaro paradox to hold.
38  At best empirical tests have provided 
microeconomic evidence consistent with the migration incentives present in the Harris-
Todaro model, measuring for instance how rural dwellers respond to an increase in the 
wage differential (see Section 3). But this type of evidence does not provide a real test of 
the link between urban unemployment and migration. In other words, the validity of the 
model has not been clearly established even though it certainly influenced policies for 
decades.  
 
Many countries have implemented policies aimed at forbidding migration from rural to 
urban areas. In South Africa, the Apartheid system (1948-1994) used extreme controls to 
monitor what was meant to be the temporary migration of rural workers to cities. In 
Indonesia, the ‘transmigration program’, a policy of resettlement from high to low-
density areas has been implemented over several decades, resulting in the relocation of 
more than eight million people between 1969 and 1995 (Humanitarian Policy and 
Conflict Research, 2002).  Similarly, in China, the Hukou or household registration 
system initiated in 1955 required that all residents live in the places where they were born 
and obtain permissions to move (see Cheng and Selden, 1994, for more details). Until the 
1970s, migrants were even transferred back to their village in order to prevent ‘over-
urbanization’. Some of these programs did meet their objectives of restricting rural to 
urban migration, but very few have been subjected to a rigorous analysis of their welfare 
costs.  Au and Henderson (2006)’s empirical finding suggest that migration restrictions in 
China have maintained surplus labor in rural areas and led to insufficient agglomeration 
of economic activity in cities, resulting in GDP losses.  
 
Other policies aimed at providing people with incentives not to migrate have been less 
extreme. In India and Malaysia, nativist policies favored persons locally born 
(Waddington, 2003).  Attempts have also been made to ensure that urban development 
                                                 
38 The literature provides mixed and controversial evidence. For instance, Barnum and Sabot (1977) 
believed that the Todaro paradox did occur in Tanzania. But Collier (1979) later argued that Barnum and 
Sabot’s test was limited to the extent that it treated urban unemployment as an exogenous explanatory 
variable. Basing his own study on a general equilibrium model for Tanzania, Collier suggested that the 
informal sector expanded because of a rise in primary education which increased the number of workers 
eligible for unskilled wage employment but not because of formal employment expansion as a Todaro 
explanation would have implied.   48
did not appear too attractive for potential rural migrants.  For this reason, the Mexican 
government discouraged certain types of investment in the largest metropolitan areas 
(Cole and Sanders, 1983). Thailand, India or Peru also introduced policies to discourage 
migration to big cities (Waddington, 2003).  
 
Rural development schemes have also been used as an indirect way of deterring 
migration to cities. While rural development schemes appear to have been relatively 
successful in Latin America (since non-agricultural rural employment is steadily 
growing, Schejtman, 1999), they have not universally met their objectives. For instance, 
Malaysia’s rural development policies which did help the rural poor, did not stem 
urbanization (Skeldon, 1997). Since the late 1970s, China has pursued a strategy of rural 
industrialization, which has reduced intraprovincial migration but has had no effect on 
interprovincial migration, suggesting that rural enterprises may have absorbed only 
potential migrants who would have migrated within rather than between provinces 
(Liang, Chen and Gu, 2002).  
 
By contrast to the Todarian models, the rural surplus labor models -- supporting rural to 
urban migration -- seem to be better founded. What really matters in the Lewis, Ranis and 
Fei models is not whether there is disguised unemployment in rural areas, but whether the 
rural sector can massively supply migrants to the urban sector to accompany rapid 
national growth. Evidence so far confirms that this is indeed the case in China (see 
Henderson, 2005).
39 The policy implication is that rural to urban migration should not be 
impeded.  
 
As a result, policies in developing countries are increasingly more concerned with 
influencing the direction of rural to urban migration flows – e.g. to particular areas -- 
with the implicit understanding that migration will occur anyway and thus should be 
accommodated at as low a cost as possible. The idea is often to prevent massive inflows 
to large overcrowded cities while helping migrants of rural origin to find a job in smaller 
                                                 
39 This is consistent with Knight, Song and Huaibin (1999)’s remark that, in China, most of the increase in 
urban demand for labor in the years to come will have to be met from the rural areas.   49
or medium-sized cities. This is usually advocated through the decentralization of 
infrastructure and activities with a view to create new centers of growth that will be able 
to absorb the rural population influx. Bangladesh for instance is trying to reduce the 
congestion of city centers by promoting industries and services in periurban areas and 
secondary cities (Skeldon, 2003b). With the benefit of hindsight, industrial and urban 
decentralization strategies have been fairly successful in Korea and Cuba, but faced 
significant challenges in India, Malaysia and Tanzania (Waddington, 2003).
40  
 
To our knowledge, whether or not rural to urban migration in developing countries 
should be diverted from large  cities  to secondary and tertiary cities  as a policy objective 
has not been analyzed yet in an adapted theoretical framework.  Similarly, whether the 
diverse array of programs that have been or will be implemented are successful and at 
what cost remains to be evaluated. They could prove difficult to implement because of 
the dispersal of the population in rural areas and because of weak institutions. If such 
programs are to be generalized, should potential migrants be trained before or after 
migrating?
 41  What is the best way to facilitate information sharing in rural areas?  How 
can potential migrants better choose where to migrate given their qualifications and the 
distribution of job opportunities in urban areas?  Should recruitment agencies, analogous 
to those that are often already active in the context of international migration, help rural 
dwellers secure a job contract before migrating to the city?  What types of specific 
savings and credit programs could help workers finance migration costs?  
 
In short, the survey has shown that the class of Todarian models -- although very 
influential in the migration literature -- presents weaknesses that attenuate their validity 
for the analysis of internal migration and the design of policies. More realistic models 
that have emerged in the last two decades provide detailed insights into very specific 
issues and directions for policy recommendations. In particular, recent job-search models 
in which migration can improve job matches or models in which migration is presented 
                                                 
40 Because large development proved more effective than small-scale industries, such projects are more 
likely to succeed when they are accompanied by the necessary local infrastructure (Waddington, 2003). 
41 In the case of China, Zhao (2003) suggests that villages should be helped to initiate out-migration, which 
can afterwards turn into a self-sustaining process
 .   50
as a way to circumvent rural constraints, such as credit-market and insurance 
imperfections, support the view that internal migration in developing countries should not 
be completely checked. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that internal 
migration contributes to the development of rural areas through remittances by enabling 
the financing of productive investment and by reducing poverty even though its effects 
on inequality are mixed. In most studies, remittances are spent on both consumption and 
investment, enabling both short-term increases in the standard of living and long-term 
development in rural areas. In urban areas, internal migration does not necessarily cause 
massive unemployment as suggested by Todarian models, and studies on the labor-
market assimilation of migrants indicate that migrants can catch-up with natives under 
certain circumstances. These elements support the view that migration can be beneficial 
or at least can be turned into a beneficial phenomenon. This change in focus has strong 
implications for migration policies, suggesting that the general goal of these policies 
should probably be restated as trying to best accommodate migration flows while 
preventing the widening of urban and rural imbalances. In other words, policies should 
aim at enhancing the success of both rural migrants and non-migrants alike, ensuring that 
cities have the capacity to absorb migrants.  
 
The survey has also identified some data issues and some topics which merit further 
investigation: 
It is clear that the study of internal migration suffers from a lack of appropriate datasets. 
Future research will be much improved if it can 
(i)  Better characterize internal migration flows and stocks.  It would be very 
useful to have databases on internal migration by education in a selection of 
developing countries, complementing the work of Docquier and Marfouk 
(2005) who recently built such a database for international migration. This 
would enable researchers to compare the phases of the urbanization and 
migration process across countries, which is crucial since policy 
recommendations can differ according to the context.  
(ii)  Use panel micro datasets. This will help address several standard econometric 
problems, as well as improve the economic understanding of a process which   51
takes time and whose effects are spread out over time. For instance, with such 
data, duration models could be tested to study the employment and 
unemployment spells of workers following migration. It would also be highly 
desirable for researchers to have access to datasets incorporating an 
economically relevant and sufficiently fine spatial identifier that would enable 
researchers to better study the workings of local labor markets (since 
interactions probably occur at a small geographic level). Such data would also 
enable the matching of different sources and enable researchers to better take 
into account the local contexts of both origin and destination areas. In this 
respect, surveys with information on both areas of origin and areas of 
destination (for instance village studies matched with a sample of migrants 
originating from the area) should prove very useful. Building such datasets is 
costly but it is important to gain a sufficiently fine understanding of the 
migration process to make it beneficial. 
 
Without being exhaustive, the following topics emerge as important for future research:  
(i)  There is a need to identify which individual, contextual, or even institutional 
factors can make migration succeed or fail. The role of education in 
accelerating the assimilation of migrants to the labor market has been shown. 
It remains to be investigated whether education acquired in  the place of origin 
or in the place of destination is more helpful, and how the assimilation of 
uneducated workers could be enhanced.  
(ii)  Another important issue concerns the minimum level of urban public services 
which should be provided to migrants, considering that public goods are 
congestible, that migrants may not have the capacity to finance their shares, 
but that public services can be key in initiating successful assimilation.  
(iii)  Research is also needed to investigate which types of labor-market 
intermediation would be more efficient in matching the rural supply and the 
urban demand for labor. This would involve studying in more detail how 
migrants find their jobs but also the impact of job-search methods on the 
occupations they find. One related issue would be whether migrants are   52
efficiently distributed across jobs and industries. If this is the case, then 
policies should only aim at facilitating the matching process, but if not, then 
policies should also try to channel migrants towards particular industries.  
(iv)  Another line of research which deserves to be pursued concerns the 
relationship between migration and rural development. How is rural 
development affected by alternative modes of migration such as circular or 
temporary migration? Does circular migration result in more money injected 
in the rural economy (or in money better invested) than permanent migration 
to cities? Does circular migration enable more contacts between successful 
migrants and rural dwellers creating a virtuous dynamic? Determining which 
type of rural development is more likely to be successful also remains on the 
agenda. In particular, what should be the balance between stimulating on-farm 
vs off-farm activities?  
(v)  The economic and social consequences of the gender imbalance in migration 
flows would also need to be studied.  
(vi)  Finally, the interplay between internal and international migration deserves 
closer scrutiny. Because of the selectivity between internal and international 
migrants, the contexts and policy implications of the two phenomena can 
differ. But what are the similarities between the two phenomena? And how 
can research on internal migration draw from advances in research on 




Econometric and methodological problems in migration studies 
 
The imperfection of the data used to study migration is often a source of specific 
econometric problems. We discuss these issues in order. 
 
An obvious problem lies with the relevant measure of income to be used in migration-
decision models. In the income differential perspective, the variable explaining migration 
is the difference in the discounted expected streams of real income. Wages are only 
considered as proxies for the present value of income flows or for permanent income and 
are typically used in regressions such as (3.3’), (3.3’’) or (3.4’’). Not only is the use of 
wages as a proxy debatable, but earnings may be biased with measurement error, 
especially in rural areas. In all rigor, incomes should be corrected for remittances 
potentially paid or received. Moreover, it is real wages that should be used in the 
estimations and not nominal wages, but coming up with a relevant local cost of living to 
deflate nominal wages can be problematic. Finally, it is worth stressing that the migration 
decision could be specified as a function of the difference in expected wages (and not just 
wages), especially when the stylized facts confirm that many workers migrate before 
having found a job. Unfortunately, standard datasets seldom provide information on 
workers’ pre-migration earnings expectations.  
 
In addition, the specification of the migration-decision process can be incomplete if the 
migration equation only includes wage differentials and individual characteristics. This is 
because, in the real world, migration decisions are based on utility differences between 
regions and not just wage differences. Since high wages (resp. low wages) could 
compensate for unpleasant local amenities (resp. pleasant local amenities), only non-
amenity compensating wage differentials across regions should correspond to utility 
differentials that can induce migration. Omitting regional amenities in the estimated 
model can induce a correlation between the error term and wages, biasing the   54
estimations. Furthermore, it is all the more important to control for local amenities as 
there are often dramatic differences in the provision of public services between rural and 
urban areas in developing countries. Another important specification problem is that 
changes in personal characteristics which can explain migration (for instance getting 
married) might be endogenous. The use of bivariate probits to simultaneously model the 
two events can be a way to address this issue. For instance, Osberg, Gordon and Li 
(1994) use a bivariate probit to study interindustry labor mobility and interregional 
migration in Canada, which they view as simultaneously determined processes. 
 
Another recurrent econometric problem is the use of biased datasets. As Greenwood 
(1997) observes, this can happen when working on administrative files, for instance if 
only those with sufficient income are required to file an income tax form. The problem 
remains with panel data because of panel attrition (if there are systematic unobserved 
differences between individuals who remain in the panel and those who disappear, and if 
these characteristics also explain the dependant variable). Similarly, if the two dates 
between which migration is measured are too far apart (more than 1 year for instance), 
return migrants may be censored from the sample and this selection might bias the 
estimates if only those who succeeded stayed in the urban area of destination. Another 
source of selectivity is that the nature of self-selection may change over time. This can 
happen, for instance, if the average quality of migrants is lower under favorable 
economic conditions (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989). In any case, this issue should be 
addressed when comparing migration outcomes from different periods (as in Borjas, 
Bronars and Trejo, 1992). More generally, the use of datasets not aimed at studying 
migration or the use of non-random community case studies are problematic (see World 
Bank, 2005). 
 
In any case, panel data is to be preferred over cross-section data. One good reason to use 
panel data is that it allows to address the classical endogeneity issues (for instance due to 
unobserved characteristics) by working on differences. But panel data are also 
particularly relevant to investigate the consequences of migration over time. Particular 
issues such as whether migrants might at first accept a drop in earnings anticipating a   55
wage growth in later periods can only be addressed with panel data which provide 
information on the income streams associated with migration. However, the use of panel 
data does not solve all problems: if the data used is censored to the right and too recent 
relative to the time of migration, one might underestimate the lifetime returns to 
migration. 
 
Lastly, since migration is about movements from one place to another, the way places are 
spatially delineated cannot be neutral in the analysis. The researcher should wonder what 
the relevant spatial breakdown could be, and if the predefined areas more or less 
correspond to independent local labor markets. At one extreme, broad-scale studies 
focusing on the movements between one aggregate heterogeneous region called ‘urban 
areas’ and another one called ‘rural areas’ may be misleading and can shed only little 
light on the actual migration process.    56
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